American Republic Online

Last month, General Petraeus was nominated to lead Central Command. His will probably one of Bush’s few disputed nominations. Even Democrats have softened their blows over his success in Iraq (though they don’t call it that). Presidential hopeful Barrack Obama remarked that

“I think that both of you gentlemen are doing the absolute best that you can given an extraordinarily difficult situation…”

General Petraeus has indeed been quite successful in Iraq. When is the last time we’ve heard about a civil war, or the word quagmire? The General’s success (thus far) has come through a “new” strategy. That is, his is a strategy akin to the old saying that “war is politics by another means.” Or, at least in Petraeus’ case, success has come through a union of war and politics. He recognized that victory would only come by involving local politicians. Demonstrable military strength coupled with political maneuvering have led to the recent stability in Iraq [note: so have the trebled oil prices, but that’s another post]. These two factors build on each other: they are not mutually exclusive. A strong military presence is not enough (as demonstrated over the past few years), nor is political will. Combined, however, is/was necessary. Petraeus saw this, and implemented it to a noticeable success.

This is where it gets interesting.

His success in Iraq was, no doubt, the rationale behind his nomination to Central Command. For one, successes tend to bring promotions. However, and perhaps more importantly, in this position he would not only maintain authority over Iraq, but he would also gain authority over the military in Afghanistan. If the situation in Iraq is getting better, the opposite is true in Afghanistan. The Taliban is re-exerting itself and demonstrating the thin balance of power in the country. The situation there has deteriorated significantly. This is due to the two aforementioned factors: military and political strength. Both are meager, to say the least. The military has never had a large number of troops on the ground there, and it is still a fraction of the number in Iraq. In addition, the political situation has always been tenuous at best.

Enter General Petraeus.

It can be reasonably assumed that there is an expectation that he will be able to achieve a similar measure of success in Afghanistan. And therein lies the rub: his strategy is built upon a military-political synergy. According to this strategy, there are simply not enough troops in Afghanistan.

Enter our politicians.

For years, our political class has been telling us that the real fight, the “real war on terror” is in Afghanistan.

Speaker Pelosi has said it:

“..The war on terror is the war in Afghanistan,”

The Senate Democrats’ have said that the war in Iraq has

“distracted us from the real war on terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan…”

The DNC’s website criticizes McCain for losing sight of the

“real war on terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”

Even their new assumed nominee Barrack Obama is campaigning on

“finishing the fight in Afghanistan.”

Etc. etc.

SO, if Petraeus applies his strategy in Afghanistan, he will most likely request more troops for the job. And if he does so, will Obama still think that

“America must urgently begin deploying from Iraq and take the fight more effectively to the enemy’s home by destroying al-Qaida’s leadership along the Afghan-Pakistan border…”

Or will the priority be to “bring the troops home?” As much as they have been reminding us that we should be in Afghanistan, and as much as they insist we must bring our troops home, which will it be? Can they do both? And what will voters think of either reaction?

As troops begin leaving Iraq in the coming months, and as Petraeus soon rises in authority, it’s going to get interesting.